INTRODUCTION
The International Thermonuiclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) is the fist fusion device that will have sufficient decay heat and activation product inventory to pose potential nuclear safety concerns. As a result, nuclear safety and environmental issues will play a much stronger role in the approval process for the siting, design, consuuctioin, and operation of ITER in the United States than for previous fusion devices such as the Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor (TETR). The purpose of this paper is (a) to provide an overview of the regulatory approval process for a Department of Enlergy (DOE) facility, (b) to present the radiological dose limits used by DOE to protect workers, the public, and the environment from the risks of exposure to radiation, (c) to discuss three key nuclear safetyrelated issues, illustrative of the sieveral issues that need to be addressed for ITER early in the Engineering Design Activities (EDA) to help ease regulatory approval, and (d) to provide general guidelines to the ITER Joint Central Team (JCT) concerning the development of a regulatory framework for the ITER project. Additional information can be found in Reference [ 11.
OVERVIEW OF THE US.-DOE REGULATORY PROCESS
The regulatory approval process for a DOE facility in the United States is best understoo'd when viewed within the context of the total life cycle of a I X E facility. This life cycle is comprised of a number of major phases. Each phase involves interfacing between the licensee/operator (in this case ITER) and the govemment regulatory body, i.e., DOE or DOE as agent for the ultimate source of the regulatory requirement (e.g., other federal agencies anid departments such as the 0-7803-14 12-3$04.0001994IEEE
Occupational Safety and Health Organization, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Transportation, and state agencies). This interfacing with its associated briefings, document submittals, reviews, evaluations, inspections, concurrences, and approvals is the U.S. DOE regulatory approval process. The following are typical life cycle phases of a DOE facility:
Baseline requirements (encompassing mission, need, and functional and operational requirements); Siting (country, state, specific laws) National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Considerations (encompassing environmental assessments, environmental impact statements and records of decision); Design (encompassing conceptual, Title I and 11); Safety Analysis (encompassing hazard assessments and categorization, preliminary and final safety analyses, and technical safety requirements); Construction (including acquisition, test, assembly, and Title 111); Operation (including operational readiness reviews, staffing, program execution and facility modifications); Decommissioning (including cleanup, waste management, and site restoration). This paper presents an overview of a few of the phases judged to have unique relevance for ITER.
A. Baseline Requirements
Planning/preparation is the initial step in the approval process and consists primarily of documenting all of the baseline requirements for the activity. These requirements include the missiodneed statements formally agreed to by the operational owner and the program funding source and the functional and operational requirements (F&OR) for the activity. The F&OR are input for virtually all aspects of the regulatory process. They are a dynamic productkesult of the systems-engineering process which characterizes the enure facility acquisition, regulatory approval activity. As such, the F&OR will be constantly revised in response to the trade-off decisions that are endemic in the process of the owneroperator demonstrating compliance with the specific requirements to the requirements source agent.
One of the most important elements of the baseline requirements phase is the definition of all of the specific regulatory-type products (e.g.,EIS, PSAR, SAR,) together with their review and approval actions: (e.g., who by organization and position must review, the functional purpose of the review, who must approve, time schedules for each review and approval action) required throughout the activity life cycle.
While the foregoing baseline requirements definition activity may not be immediately perceived as a part of the regulatory process per se, it must be stressed that it is in fact an absolute necessity for an efficient, effective, and successful regulatory approval process.
It is imperative that the baseline requirements development task ' E managed to ensure that the task identifies and incorporates any new requirements that will evolve. The role of the baseline requirements task is to identify the total comprehensive list of requirements that must be addressed for ITER. The final but perhaps most important point to be made regarding the baseline requirements task is that of assessing the necessity and sufficiency of all elements in the baseline requirements and the associated task of negotiating with and through the DOE Office of Fusion Energy (OFE), all of the waivers and exclusions that are necessary to eliminate irrelevant requirements. This activity would demonstrate that fusion is implementing a disciplined, managed application of the 'graded approach'. It has long been recognized within the DOE system that the blanket application of DOE order requirements contributes to inefficiencies and cost ineffectiveness. Accordingly implementation plans that describe the managed actions required to execute the relevant DOE direction are becoming the rule for all orders issued to contractors for compliance. Formal records of all such negotiated waivers and exclusions will be an essential progmdproject management item and the provisions for such should be highlighted in the baseline requirements planning.
B. NEPA Considerations
One of the Fist major regulatory requirements to be addressed for the ITER is the Environmental Impact issue which derives from the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 [2] . The process is designed to extensively involve the public by presenting opportunities for public input throughout its execution.
A Notice of Intent (NOI) and its comment period provide input to the scoping or planning phase of the prccess. This phase is designed to: identify public and agency concerns, define the issues and alternatives that will be examined in detail, ensure that the draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) addresses the issues, and develop a strategy and plan for EIS preparation.
The public and agency comments obtained during the comment period will be available to DOE (and JCT) to identify major issues and to define the final alternatives that will be evaluated in the EIS. The results of this phase will be reflected in an Implementation Plan for the draft EIS. The EIS, draft and ultimately the final, will report the necessary background, data, and analyses to help decision makers understand the potential environmental consequences of each of the alternatives identified for implementation of the siting and operation of the ITER. The NEPA process is not limited to facilities built in the U.S. An EIS will be required by the U.S. even if ITER were sited in another country because of DOES responsibility in the project.
DOE-OFE will be the primary JCT interface for the ITER environmental compliance actions in the U.S. The specific responsibilities and authorities of other DOE HQ and Field personnel for implementation of the NEPA assessment process are set forth in DOE 5440.1E [3] . Additional guidance is also provided in DOE 4700.1 [4].
The EIS deals primarily with operational environmental issues by defining the environmental impacts of the project, but it also provides the initial facility safety analysis. The current trend in DOE is toward increasing the level of sophistication in the safety analysis in the EIS, despite lacking a detailed design. The Record of Decision, ROD, prepared and published by DOE after completion of the final EIS, states DOE'S decision on which of the various courses of action described in the EIS will be pursued. The safety analysis information in the EIS is the baseline from which later more detailed safety analyses will evolve. These later analyses will be documented in the facility preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) and ultimately in the final safety analysis report (FS'W.
C. Design
The design phase for a DOE facility is certainly one of the most important life-cycle phases however, its impact on the overall regulatory process is more tactical than strategic. The actual design process itself which is the essence of the design phase is not particularly relevant to setting the overall strategy for regulatory approval planning. However, various subphases of the design process are in fact 'hold points for approval actions by various interfacing organizations, and many design related activities and their associated time scheduling are crucial to the overall regulatory approval process. Thus, we highlight those aspects that are most salient to regulatory approval. DOE use a series of Major Project Key Decisions to track the key interfaces for a DOE Major System Acquisition like ITER [4]. These Key Decisions will have to be considered in establishing the milestones for the ITER regulatory approval plan. It is expected that these Key Decisions would be addressed in the development of the baseline requirements, that they would be assessed to determine their applicability to ITER and then integrated into the overall ITER Project Plan. The Key Decisions are an integral part of the DOE funding decisions and as such, they may or may not directly integrate individually into the ITER planning. Key Decision 0 is cases or input decks that test much of the logic in the code to ensure that the code performs as !stated in the theoryhser's manual. All design and safety analyses should be verified because it is good engineering practice.
Validation is defined as thle process of evaluating software to ensure compliance with software requirements and physical applicability to the process being modeled. It is generally a more involved process than verification.
Validation of a code would consist of comparing it with known analytic solutions for problems similar, yet perhaps simpler, than the problem at hand. It would also include benchmarking the code against relevant experimental data thus assuring that the analysis reasonably captures the correct physicskhemistry. It could also include comparison against an already validated computer code. A code would be considered validated if it met the predetermined acceptance criteria, for example, that the code results agreed with the data within a predetermined factor or prixiuced results that were in agreement with another validated ctxie.
The number and type of benchmarking problems needed for a code are strong functions of the complexity of the phenomena being modeled, its range of applicability, and the data that are or could be avaihble. For a complicated computer code, verification could require that both individual models and submodels in the code. be verified and validated against separate effects type data amd that integral validation of the code also be performed. For a code to be considered validated to a given quality level, the key data with which it is compared should be of the same quality level. Thus, V&V requirements for codes can impact the type of database/testing that is necessary, which will be discussed later. All of these issues are a function of the specific technical area and need to be considered in the respective V&' V plans.
Our examination of some recent DOE programs [l] indicates that a graded approach was used to determine the level of detail and rigor in the verification and validation process. The level degree of \r&V varied significantly because of differences in interpretation relative to implementation of the standards, was strongly correlated to the size of the budget in the program, and was impacted by serious practical limitations, like the quality of the data used to develop correlations in the code and the quality of the data used in the validation process.
Based on this review, the following guidelines are offered for consideration for ITER:
(a) The ITER JCT must determine overall V&V policy to be used for design and safety analyses. 
B. Safety Class Ltems
Establishment of the safety class items (SCI) for ITER is a nuclear safety related issue that requires early attention in the entire EDA activity. Safety class items are defined by DOE 6430.PE [15] and 5480.EQ [29] to be systems, components, and structures, including portions of process systems, whose failure could adversely affect the safety and health of the public, facility personnel, and site workers, and cause unacceptable impact to the environment. Non-safety class items are those items whose failure shall not adversely affect the environment or the safety and heairh of the public.
There is no intermediate class of items between safety and non-safety class. DOE 6430.1B [15] does explain that the graded approach can be used to define safety class items by identifying those design basis accident (DB A) events that have the potential for radioactive or chemical releases that threaten the public, the environment, or the worker: determining the equipment necessary to prevent or mitigate the effects of the accident and stating its safety function, and then developing the environmental envelope that the equipment must be able to survive based on the DBA events.
For nonreactor nuclear facilities, like ITER, DOE 6430.1B [15] requires consideration of the ASME Code requirements in the design and fabrication of safety class components. The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section 111, Nuclear Plant Components [30] provides requirements for the design of pressure retaining components and has been adopted for power plants. Applicable components are designated as Class 1, 2, or 3 depending on their intended function and importance. DOE states that safety class items shall be designed to Class 2 rules. Thus. as currently written in the order, fusion safety components would not have to be designed to Class 1 rules which are very restrictive. DOE 6430.1B [15] has made provision for similar applicability questions and states that safety class systems can be designed to other comparable safety-related codes and standards that are appropriate for the system being designed.
The order also states that for non-safety class items the design shall be subject to conventional industrial design standards, codes, and quality standards.
The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel code was adopted by DOE for application to fission reactors and some other nuclear applications. We are not aware of any specific application decisions for fusion facilities. Therefore, the JCT will have ensure the identification of all SCIs in ITER, determine what structural design criteria and standards are appropriate for fusion materials irradiated to high neutron fluences and identify the schedules, interfaces etc. associated with the management of the SCI issue. Of course an integral part of these activities would be the identification of the fusion relevant requirements in existing directives and the negotiation at the earliest possible time of waivers, exclusions and exemptions from requirements that are irrelevant to the ITER.
C. Experimental Databases Needed for Regulatory Approval
Experimental databases i.e., test results will be needed to support the design, safety analysis, and the regulatory approval process for ITER. There must be an adequate quality assurance program in place to assure the quality of the data collected. Data must be retained in auditable files. These requirements will add both time and money to the cost of R&D testing programs.
Furthermore, the additional formalism in the documentation (e.g., test plans, test procedures) will result in reduced flexibility in terms of the program's ability to accommodate changes in scope in the test program when new technical information or questions arise. The potential impact of this issue warrants recommending that when a fonnal test program that meets the quality assurance requirements is needed, a less formal more scoping test capability be retained to resolve unforeseen technical questions. This alternative test capability can provide scoping data in a timely manner with which to evaluate the technical issue and yet does not impact the more formal test program. If the scoping data suggest a change in direction for the more formal testing then this change can be effected in a cost effective manner.
Various types of testing methods can produce compliance with DOE 5480.EQ [29] . They include testing an identical item under identical or similar conditions with analysis to show qualification, using operating experience with identical or similar equipment under similar conditions with analysis to show qualification, or using analysis and partial type test data that supports the assumptions and conclusions to show qualification. DOE 6430.1B [15] also indicates that all systems for which regulatory credit is taken to meet the accident release criteria of 250 mSv must be testable in-place in terms of "pressure, filtration or removal efficiency, alarm capability, leak resistance, and the like." In addition, safety class items, discussed earlier, must be designed to be testable on a regular basis.
Thus, there is some flexibility in terms of the method(s) of testing to be used and the proper 'mix' of testing and data that need to be obtained to produce a credible safety and/or design database. However, because in ITER as in many other nuclear projects, much of the testing can never exactly simulate the conditions expected, differing judgments may be expected concerning the adequacykompleteness of the testing program. In addition, the approach that is used to verify and validate the computer codes will impact the amount of the data and the type of testing that are needed. Sound engineering judgment and technical logic will be needed to determine the optimum mix of testing.
Databases developed in the fission industry can be used as a starting point to help define the key technical issues that must be considered relative to the type of testing and the adequacy of the database that is needed. Historically in the fission community, the type of testing has been driven by three effects: scale, complexity of phenomena to be studied, and environmental effects.
The issue of scale is one of prototypicaiity. Small scale laboratory tests are relatively inexpensive but usually not prototypic of the engineering system or structure. Testing can be performed using scaled facilities or components, however scaling is always a controversial technical issue because of concem over the adequacy of the scaling law and the need for extrapolation to make statements about the actual behavior of the system. Prototypic testing is more expensive but can provide direct information on the performance of a system or structure. In most fission projects, all three types of testing have been used. Clearly, for moderate sized components or systems, prototype testing is cost effective and subject to the least uncertainty. When the actual (component or system is too large to test, either scaled testing or in-situ testing can be used. Careful planning and thought needs to be used in developing scaled test facilities.
The complexity of the phenomena to be studied determine what mix of separate effects testing and integral testing need to be performed. In cases where the phenomena to be studied are fairly simple, separate effects tests are probably adequate.
However, if there are importamt competing materials interactions, physical phenomena, andor chemical reactions that determine the ultimate behavior of a system or structure under specified conditions then integral testing is also necessary. The complexity of the analysis toolkomputer code being used to predicthnderstand the phenomena or system is also important here. If the computer code consists of a set of submodels that must interact in a complex way, then data to test each specific submodel as well as the entire code could be required. Such issues need to be addressed in the computer code V&V plan which would then impact the R&D testing.
Radiation is one of the key environmental effects that need to be considered in developing the test program for nuclear components. If irradiation effects are not important then out-of-pile experiments are probably adequate. If irradiation effects are important, then irradiated material andor in-pile experiments are also necessary. Furthermore, the lack of a 14 Mev neutron source for studying material irradiation behavior is a key weakness, the impact of which will need to be addressed in any fusion material testing program and database. For fusion, there is also a concem about thermal cycling and the electromagnetic environment and their potential impact on the behavior and reliability of equipment.
Finally, DOE 5480.EQ [29] also states that synergistic effects be considered in the testing programs. Thus, the coupled effects of radiation and magnetic fields might need to be considered for some components.
Because of its first of a kind nature and its mission ITER may not be able to have databases that are of the Same caliber and scope as comparable fission dalabases. In addition, some of the testing issues such as synergistic effects, radiation damage (i.e., lack of 14 MeV neutron source), and scale probably cannot be addressed in existing facilities and may only be addressed by ITER itself. Thus, some pre-operational testing with ITER or ITER components will have to be performed prior to receiving approval for D-T operation. For example, in-situ testing of the magnets may have to be performed to ultimately qualify them for operation. However, even with some operational experience in ITER the lack of a robust database at full neutron flulence will limit the safety credit that can be taken for key irradiated components such as the first wall, blanket, and divertor.
GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR JCT
ITER will be a first of a kind machine and as such will pose unique regulatory concems. A significant effort will need to be devoted to educating regulators about fusion, ITER, and its approach to safety so that fusion technology is understood. For the ITER JCT, the following guidelines are recommended to develop a regulatory framework that is beneficial to ITER and fusion:
(a) maintain an approach that focuses on the needs of fusion and the ITER to ensure that the requirements of this technology are foremost in the decision processes and that the history and experience of the fission industry are kept in proper perspective neither being blindly adopted nor summarily dispositioned as mere strawmen.
(b) recognize ITER'S experimental nature in the development of regulatory requirements (c) focus on hazard reduction and passivehnherent safety design solutions as means of preventing accidents (c) implement a graded approach policy in the overall management of the project such that all requirements are proportionate to the associated risk (d) integrate the use of risWbenefit and costhenefit analyses into the overall graded approach system to help guide the development of licensing requirements to the maximum extent possible.
(e) implement a policy of detecting and fixing problems at the lowest value stage possible such that an 'earliest time possible' culture is built into the ITER management system. This will result in the adoption of implementation techniques that can be used to demonstrate compliance with requirements in the EDA and thus minimize regulatory uncertainties.
( f ) highlight in the ITER requirements review and adoption processes the importance of not precluding innovative approaches in design and safety by the adoption of any requirement.
(8) implement a configuration management policy that will result in a minimum number of separate documents used to define requirements thus reducing the potential for contradiction and conflict and enhancing the probability of always being in compliance.
We strongly recommend that the US immediately start the baseline requirements activity to provide a framework for managing ITER and the regulatory approval process. Currently, the U.S. is in the process of developing an order and guidance, DOE 5480. FUSION [31] , to help define what the graded approach means for fusion facilities such as ITER and determine appropriate fusion specific approaches to many of the key nuclear safety related technical issues such as design standards for key components, implementation of the DOE graded approach in safety analysis, hazard categorization, and safety class items. Careful thought and input from the fusion community will be needed on these issues to have a defensible technological basis for our approach to obtaining regulatory approval.
The information presented in this paper has been developed primarily from considerations of DOE requirements for facilities io be designed, built and operated under DOE auspices in the U.S. While DOE directives have been the source of many of the specific requirements presented and discussed, it must be stressed that the underlying motivation for most of the requirements transcends DOE, the U.S. and any other regulatory or national considerations. The requirements by and large are endemic to the professional project management of any major technological nuclear undertaking. As such they must be understood and accepted as the underpinnings of a successful ITER. Accordingly, it is expected that the overview approach presented in this paper will be recognizable in the final ITER regulatory approach framework that will be adopted by the Parties and also that the vast majority of the results of the baseline requirements development activity will be manifest in the ITER project management pian regardless of the siting decision that will ultimately be made by the Parties.
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